This is a review of the books Why I am Not a Calvinist by Jerry Walls and Joseph Dongell and Why I am Not an Arminian by Michael Williams and Robert Peterson.
Why I am Not a Calvinist Strengths
1. Challenges inconsistencies in Calvinist presentations
2. Takes careful stock of the implications of various positions
3. Exceptionally clear and lucid presentation
4. Well structured writing that was easy to follow
5. Helpful presentation of the options available
6. Some good exegesis
Why I am Not a Calvinist Weaknesses
1. Formal logic seems to be the grid through which everything is run, including the Bible rather than vice versa
2. Presuppositions that are not directly informed by the Bible, but rather proceed from moral intuitions, philosophical commitments, etc.
3. Apparent assumption that God operates in a time bounded reality
4. Very poor treatment of the concept of federal headship
5. Exegesis, while at times quite good does not disprove a Calvinistic understanding but merely supplements it
6. Tendency to be uncharitable and caricature views as well as use poor or unfair examples
Why I am Not an Arminian Strengths
1. Strong Biblical focus
2. Clear recognition of Arminian presuppositions, especially with regard to free will
3. Use of Biblical categories and terminology where possible
4. Biblically based definition of freedom
5. Acceptance of mystery as an important category
6. Winsome Tone
Why I am Not an Arminian Weaknesses
1. Seems to shy away from admitting to acceptance of determinism
2. Talks about God’s passing over or permission without treating thoroughly the philosophical problems with speaking this way while affirming sovereignty
3. Often cites human freedom in that humans do what they want without addressing that “what they want” is determined too
4. Seems unclear on whether Adam had libertarian free will
5. Doesn’t address formally some of the logical problems that Arminians often bring up
6. At times seems to slip into construing Arminian positions according to perceived logical conclusions
Why I am Not a Calvinist
Strengths. One of the greatest strengths of Why I am Not a Calvinist, beyond the fact that it is well written and presents complex ideas in a cogent, straightforward manner, is the fact that Walls and Dongell do an excellent job of challenging what appear to be inconsistencies in many popular level, and at times academic, Calvinist presentations. For instance they take to task the idea that God simply “permits” men and women to be damned while he actually causes others to be saved. They point out that on a determinist scheme in which God foreknows all things because he has determined them it makes little sense to speak of God being passive in the eternal fate of any person. Further they point out that the Westminster Confession says that God ordains “whatsoever comes to pass,” and that it seems very strange in certain circumstances to discuss God’s foreordination as mere permission or allowance.
Tying into this Walls and Dongell are very thorough in tracing out the implications of various theological and philosophical commitments; some might even say too thorough. That is, they do an excellent job of demonstrating through syllogism and logical inference what it would seem must follow from positions such as determinism, Molinism and compatibilism. They do not accuse all those holding these positions of holding there logical conclusions (for the most part) but they do confront the reader with what they believe to be the inconsistency of not doing so. This is both a strength and a weakness because at times it seems that the authors are so uncomfortable with concepts like paradox, mystery and antinomy that they simply insist on going where there interlocutors have refused to go.
Weaknesses. I feel that there are three primary weaknesses to the approach taken in Why I am Not a Calvinist, none of which is necessarily primary, but all of which work together to prevent the authors from doing justice to the subjects discussed. First Walls and Dongell seem to take formal logic as the starting point for all thought about anything. This leads them to a truncated epistemology that can only accept as true that which can be proven through formal proofs (or at least to reject anything which seems susceptible to disproof through the same means). To some degree we all do this, and I do appreciate their comments to the effect that it is only through commitment to certain logical premises (i.e. the law of non-contradiction) that we are able to discern truth at all. However, I think this only tells part of the story. We are able to discern truth because we are made in God’s image, and the Holy Spirit and the operations of common grace are at work in this world and in us and that is more fundamental than any commitment to logical certainty or formal syllogistic comprehensiveness. Therefore, when discussing something as cosmic in scope as the nature of God’s acting in the lives of man, we should appeal first to His word and be willing to subject our understanding of logic to it.
The second weakness is really just a footnote to the first; namely Walls and Dongell bring a number of presuppositions to the table that do not even meet their logical criterion critiqued above. They handle some of these under the heading of “moral intuitions,” including the idea that it is “as obviously true that responsibility requires libertarian freedom as it is wrong to torture infants when they cry ,“ (106). It is striking that this is the one place in which they seem willing to accept that which cannot be proven logically, especially given how much of their further thought rests on these presuppositions. Further, if they were to take the Bible as their epistemic starting point they would be able to “prove” a number of things that they view as unprovable and then proceed from there to think about issues of freedom and responsibility.
Finally, it must be noted that in this writer’s opinion much of the confusion surrounding Walls and Dongell’s positions stems from an apparent conception of God as bound by time in the same way that we are. While space precludes a full analysis of this tendency suffice it to say that it colors much of their approach to foreknowledge and foreordination. While I concede that the Biblical language does often speak of God in time-laden terms, it is hard to imagine how this could be consistently avoided, and the Bible does at time take pains to make clear that God is transcendent in such a way that time constraints do not apply to Him and he does not relate to time in the same way that we do.
Why I am Not an Arminian
Strengths. The most helpful thing about Why I am Not an Arminian is its unrelenting Biblical focus. Throughout the book the authors refuse to get caught up in the tedium of the typical philosophical categories and logical conundrums associated with these debates without returning to the Biblical witness and relating the concepts discussed at an abstract level to what the Bible actually says. This commitment also leads the authors to be more honest than is common with regard to such hotly debated theological issues. The authors are forthright about the silence of the Biblical witness on many issues, resisting the temptation to innovate or speculate with regard to the secret things that belong to the Lord. Related to this strength is the authors’ diligent use of Biblical categories and terminology where such is possible. This is much more satisfying in a discussion of the behavior of God than the abstract and impersonal language often adopted from metaphysics for such discussions.
Another primary strength of Why I am Not an Arminian is Williams’ and Peterson’s recognition of Arminian presuppositions with regard to freedom. The authors succeed in making quite clear that the crux of the matter is the insistence of Arminians on putting human freedom (conceived as the ability to the contrary) at the center of all thought about God’s relation to man as an inviolable given. To be sure, Williams and Peterson are charitable, recognizing that most Arminians do this because they believe that God has given it such status; however, I believe that Williams and Peterson demonstrate convincingly that the Biblical witness simply does not support such a position.
Weaknesses. One of the chief weaknesses of Williams’ and Peterson’s book in my opinion is what seems to be a tendency to avoid using the term determinism to describe their position. Now, on the one hand this is a strength, based on my appreciation of their use of Biblical terms and categories, however, in a discussion of Calvinism and Arminianism it seems impossible to escape taking a clear position on the concept of determinism. While I think determinism is inherent in their acceptance of a compatibilist conception of human freedom, their appropriate critique of impersonal determinist language (143) left me somewhat confused as to whether they would accept a properly personalized, qualified determinism as an adequate description of their position.
Related to this is the fact that Williams and Peterson seem to refer frequently to God’s relation to the evil done by persons as passive, adopting the language of allowance and permissiveness. However, it does not seem to me that they answer the challenge (cited by Walls and Dongell) of why it is appropriate to do so. Further they often talk about humans doing what they want to do as a defense of the concept of freedom. While I agree with this compatibilist view I felt the authors did not adequately deal with the reality that what humans want to do, their wills and desires, are determined as well. It seems important to me that in these types of discussions we avoid language that sounds as if we are trying to soften what we are saying. When this is done it often feels as if Calvinists are giving with one hand what they are quietly taking with the other.
Evaluation. While I can see strengths and weaknesses in both books it seems clear to me that Why I am Not an Arminian makes the stronger case. I believe that in some ways Why I am Not a Calvinist presents a tighter, neater argument, and more emotionally and philosophically disconcerting arguments, the former preserves a much greater fidelity to the full witness of Scripture. Scripture simply must be taken as the epistemological given in any discussion of the nature of God and the way He acts. I do think that it would be helpful if the authors of both books would publish a counter-point volume or essay to each others’ books in which they could clarify where they spoke past one another.
Predestination. Finally, it would be foolish to end this review without reflecting a bit on how these two books have impacted my own understanding of the doctrine of predestination. While I remain as I began, convinced of a Calvinistic conception of the predestination of a certain number of elect to be the beneficiaries of God’s lavish grace and goodness, I did appreciate the interaction that Joseph Dongell supplied with the idea of corporate election in his exegetical work. I found myself agreeing with much of his exegesis but simply failing to see how it excluded a Calvinistic understanding rather than merely supplementing it. I have also been forced to wrestle with the infralapsarian/supralapsarian debate, and must admit that I feel the force of Walls’ contention that supralapsarianism seems to follow from a consistent Calvinist position. This seems especially true when I consider that God chose us in Christ before the foundation of the world. If this is true then it seems that the only conclusions one could draw are that a) Christ would have become incarnate whether man had sinned or not, or b) “In Him” does not necessitate incarnation, or c) God foreknew the fall and since foreknowledge implies foreordination it would seem that God must have planned the fall as the means for us to be “in Him”. I have not fully worked this out for myself yet but it was one of the primary questions that was raised for me by the books.